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Abstract 
Cognitive control refers to a set of mental abilities that allow us goal-directed be-
havior in everyday life and to flexibly adapt to permanently changing environ-
mental demands. The goal of the present dissertation was to investigate whether 
core functions in the area of conflict monitoring, conflict control, error processing 
and behavioral adjustments caused by these processes are enabled via a unitary 
control network or whether specific mechanisms that are possibly realized via 
independent control loops are responsible for the flexibility of our adaptability. I 
will approach this question from two different theoretical perspectives: Study 1 
and 2 investigate general as well as specific aspects of conflict and error 
processing by using classic conflict paradigms and time-frequency-analytic me-
thods. The focus of these analyses is on the one hand on the question, whether 
power differences in the theta band (4-8 Hz) can serve as a universal conflict 
measure and whether conflicts and errors are processed in a similar way. Study 1 
compares the modulation of theta activity across 3 paradigms (Simon, NoGo, and 
Flanker task) and roughly situates it within medial frontal (MFC) cortex, a struc-
ture which has been characterized as crucial for conflict processing in manifold 
studies. Conflicts as well as errors led to robust theta power differences and had 
therefore been used in study 2, to observe dynamic network activations during 
processing of stimulus and response conflicts. Additional to power measures 
phase coupling between MFC related electrodes and other areas such as lateral 
prefrontal cortices (LPFC), motor and perceptual areas was analyzed. Data con-
firmed that a hypothesized network consisting of MFC, lateral PFCs and motor 
areas is involved in conflict resolution. Study 3 differs from the previous studies 
because it uses the evaluative functional properties that have been assigned to 
portions of the MFC as a modulatory variable to investigate the interdependencies 
of motivational and cognitive information processing involved in cognitive con-
trol functions. Using a Simon task which was executed either during a rewarding 
or a punishing context data revealed that conflict and error processing were influ-
enced differentially by the context manipulation. While conflict processing was 
affected only marginally by reward and punishment, electrophysiological markers 
of error processing as well as behavioral adjustments were strongly influenced. In 
my opinion the present dissertation sheds light on the cognitive architecture of 
control functions in several ways: On the one hand it has been shown that by us-
ing theta dynamics general as well as specific network activity can be analyzed. 
Results confirm an involvement of MFC in these processes but also admit a re-
sponse controlling function of MFC besides lateral frontal regions. Furthermore, 
the motivational manipulation suggests that systems for conflict and error 
processing are mostly independent. Against previous assumptions, several neu-
ronal control systems seem to be engaged during conflict resolution and resulting 
behavioral adjustments. These can be analyzed using theta activity as well as dis-
sociable sensitivities to motivational influences.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Kognitive Kontrolle bezieht sich auf eine Vielzahl mentaler Fähigkeiten, die es uns erlau-
ben im täglichen Leben zielrichtete Entscheidungen zu treffen und sich flexibel an sich 
ständig ändernde Umweltanforderungen anzupassen. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Disserta-
tion war es heraus zu finden, ob Kernfunktionen im Bereich der Konfliktüberwachung, 
Konfliktkontrolle, Fehlerverarbeitung und die daraus resultierenden Verhaltensanpassun-
gen durch ein einheitliches Kontrollnetzwerk geleistet werden, oder ob spezifische Me-
chanismen die möglicherweise durch unabhängige neuronale Kontrollschleifen realisiert 
sind, die Flexibilität unserer Anpassungsfähigkeit steuern. Ich nähere mich dieser Frage 
von zwei theoretischen Ansätzen aus: Studie 1 und Studie 2 untersuchen sowohl generelle 
aus auch spezifische Aspekte der Konflikt- und Fehlerverarbeitung mit Hilfe klassischer 
Konfliktparadigmen und dem Einsatz von Zeit-Frequenz-analytischen Auswertungsme-
thoden. Im Zentrum dieser Analysen steht zum einen die Frage, ob Powerunterschiede im 
Theta Band (4-8 Hz) als universelles Konfliktmaß dienen können und ob Fehler und 
Konflikte in ähnlicher Art und Weise verarbeitet werden. Studie 1 untersucht über 3 Para-
digmen hinweg (Simon, NoGo und Flanker Aufgabe) die Modulation der Theta Aktivität 
und versucht diese grob innerhalb des medial frontalen Cortex zur verorten, einer Struktur 
die durch eine Vielzahl von Studien als entscheidend bei der Konfliktverarbeitung ange-
sehen wird. Sowohl die verschiedenen Konflikte als auch die Fehlerverarbeitung führten 
zu robusten Theta Power Unterschieden und wurden in Studie 2 genutzt, um auch dyna-
mische Netzwerkaktivierungen bei der Bearbeitung von Reiz- und Reaktionskonflikten zu 
beobachten. Zusätzlich zur Power wurde auch die Phasenkopplung zwischen medial fron-
talen Cortex (MFC) relatierten Elektroden und anderen Arealen wie lateral präfrontalen 
(LPFC), motorischen und perzeptuellen Arealen untersucht. Es konnte gezeigt werden, 
dass ein vermutetes Netzwerk bestehend aus MFC, lateralen PFCs und motorischen Area-
len bei der Lösung von Reaktionskonflikten beteiligt ist. Studie 3 unterscheidet sich von 
den vorherigen Studien dadurch, dass hier die evaluative Funktion, die ebenfalls in Teilen 
des MFC verortet wird als modulierende Variable genutzt wird, um die Wechselwirkung 
motivationaler und kognitiver Verarbeitungsprozesse im Rahmen kognitiver Kontroll-
funktionen zu untersuchen. Mithilfe einer Simon-Aufgabe, die innerhalb von belohnen-
den oder bestrafenden Kontexten durchgeführt wurde, konnte gezeigt werden, dass Konf-
likt- und Fehlerverarbeitung differentiell durch die Kontextmanipulation beeinflusst 
werden. Während Konfliktverarbeitung nur marginal durch Belohnung und Bestrafung 
beeinflusst wurde, zeigte sich, dass sowohl elektrophysiologische Marker als auch Ver-
haltensanpassungen der Fehlerverarbeitung deutlich stärker beeinflusst wurden. Meiner 
Meinung nach trägt die vorliegende Dissertation in mehrfacher Hinsicht dazu bei, die 
kognitive Architektur von Kontrollfunktionen zu charakterisieren: Zum einen kann ge-
zeigt werden, dass mit Hilfe der Thetadynamik sowohl generelle als auch spezifische 
Netzwerkaktivitäten analysiert werden können. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen eine Beteili-
gung des MFC an diesen Prozessen, räumen ihm neben frontalen Arealen aber auch eine 
Handlungskontrollfunktion ein. Weiterhin kann mit Hilfe der motivationalen Manipulati-
on nachgewiesen werden, dass es sich bei der Fehlerverarbeitung um ein von der Konf-
liktverarbeitung weitgehend unabhängiges System handelt. So scheinen entgegen voriger 
Annahmen mehrere neuronale Kontrollsysteme an der Lösung von Konflikten und daraus 
resultierenden Verhaltensanpassungen beteiligt zu sein. Diese können sowohl mit Hilfe 
von Thetaaktivität als auch dissoziierender Reaktionen auf motivationale Einflussfaktoren 
untersucht werden. 
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1 Theoretical and Empirical Overview 
“It is necessary to study not only parts and processes in isolation, but also to 
solve the decisive problems found in organization and order unifying them, 
 resulting from dynamic interaction of parts, and making the behavior of 
 the parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole...” 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory 
1.1 Introduction and Research Questions 
Every day of our lives is determined by manifold choices and decisions that most 
of the time sum up to certain goal-directed behaviors. Imagine yourself on a rainy 
day driving a car during rush hour in the city: permanently you will have to moni-
tor for other cars, street signs, traffic lights, a sudden rerouting, observe kids play-
ing on the pavement and yelling seniors on their bikes. Furthermore, due to an 
inspiring social gathering yesterday you woke up too late knowing that in case 
you don’t hurry up you will be delayed to a very important meeting with your 
boss. Due to this the emotional pressure your reaction to sudden changes in the 
traffic might be improved, but at the same time you might be susceptible to driv-
ing a bit too fast and risk an accident...  
In cognitive terms you are confronted with a stream of dynamic information 
which you have to monitor continuously. You have to register environmental cues, 
your own behavior as well as behaviors of others according to your set goal. You 
will permanently adjust your attentional resources in a moment-to-moment fa-
shion to the salient and expedient events and you will be influenced by your cur-
rent mood and motivations. Although these higher-level functions have been stu-
died intensively for the past decades, also regarding their break-down in certain 
neuropsychiatric disorders such as ADHD, Schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease and 
many others, not much is known about the neuronal realization of these processes 
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that allow us to adapt flexibly to an unpredictably changing environment. While 
describing such higher control functions, a demon of cognitive neuroscience - the 
so-called “homunculus” - has repeatedly had his comeback, especially when con-
ceptual considerations failed to incorporate the emergent and reciprocal organiza-
tion of the cognitive system (Thompson and Varela, 2001). However, recent ap-
proaches try to avoid such notions and use also computational models besides 
other neuroscience methods to characterize our cognitive capabilities underlying 
executive functions (Hazy et al., 2007).  
The present work investigated the properties of an assumed modular executive 
control system which consists according to latest theories of several functional-
neuro-cognitive mechanisms. These dissociable mechanisms are responsible for 
the detection of and adaptation to conflicts, the regulation and evaluation of beha-
vioral outcomes and presumably are influenced by low-level motivational and 
emotional systems. I have chosen a very broad scope to characterize the different 
functional properties of the cognitive system which can be subsumed under two 
perspectives: The first perspective will relate to within-trial adaptation which is 
basically measuring online-adjustments and respective brain mechanisms engaged 
during processing and resolution of a conflict. To deepen the understanding of 
neuronal aspects of conflict processing I will use conflicts at different levels of 
processing to prove that different neuronal pathways are activated during different 
conflicts. The second perspective looks at the modulatory influences of affective 
states on across-trial adaptation processes. I will use a motivational manipulation 
to figure out how error and conflict processing are affected by these manipulations 
and which conclusions can be drawn from these dissociable effects. In my view, 
although the two perspectives arise from very different theoretical approaches the 
interplay of affective states and cognitive processes can help to elucidate how our 
control systems are organized. 
Along the introductory part of this thesis I will develop three main research ques-
tions that comprise different aspects of cognitive control functions: The first ques-
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tion of interest is how general or specific conflict control can be engaged: there-
fore I will compare on-line adjustments in cognitive control in different paradigms 
within trials and distill a new measure which reflects conflict processing in the 
brain. Another notion here regards the question, whether errors are treated such a 
conflicts or whether they only share some certain processes with conflicts. The 
second question deepens the connection between cognitive conflicts and underly-
ing neuronal mechanisms by asking how different types of conflict, namely per-
ceptual and response conflict, can be characterized by the time-frequency dynam-
ics within the theta range and inter-areal communication. The third question is 
concerned with the influence of motivational incentives on conflict adaptation 
processes as well as error monitoring. Here, I will focus on inter-trial adaptation 
and error processing and how these mechanisms can be modulated by motivation-
al incentives. 
In the upcoming chapters I will (1) outline the development of theoretical frame-
works for cognitive control functions also by reviewing their assumed neuronal 
counterparts, (2) explain which methodological approaches we used to address the 
question of general and specific properties of control, and (3) report the results 
and main conclusions of the performed studies. Finally, I will give (4) a general 
discussion of the studies and (5) propose future directions to close the gap be-
tween the perspectives of cognitive conflict resolution processes and its reciprocal 
connections with affective and motivational processing. 
1.2 Conflict Processing and its Control 
From an evolutionary perspective brains are constructed to predict the environ-
ment. To do so, learning mechanisms that code whether an external event predicts 
positive or negative outcomes are crucial. Despite these humans developed a set 
of mental abilities that have previously been labeled by terms such as executive 
functions or cognitive control. These labels comprise interconnected functions 
that can usually be classified in one of the following functional categories such as, 
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goal representations (Bunge, 2004; Miller and Cohen, 2001), on-line maintenance 
/ working memory (Baddeley, 1998; Braver and Cohen, 1999; Goldman-Rakic, 
1996), top-down biasing (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Norman and Shallice, 
1980; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977) and interference / conflict management 
(Botvinick et al., 2004; Carter et al., 1998). In general, these abilities in humans 
constitute the basis for a very powerful repertoire of goal-directed behaviors in-
cluding overcoming automatic behavior, inhibition of pre-potent responses, plan-
ning and cognitive flexibility. One could roughly say that humans are hyper-
adaptive organisms and perfect in predicting contingencies between observations 
from the outside and expectations from past experience by these means optimizing 
their behavior.  
1.2.1 Functional Perspectives on within-trial Control 
Imagine you are crossing a street in the UK: residing on continental Europe you 
are used to look to the left whenever you cross the street. Therefore, you will be 
confronted with a new environment you will have to adapt to by establishing new 
behaviors according to the incoming stimuli and goals. During your stay you will 
learn to inhibit the learned impulsive urge to look to the left and you will over-
come this by a top-down controlled sight to the right. This learning process can be 
advanced via additional task-relevant information (as written on the pavement) or 
sudden aversive events that will motivate you to foster the new behavior (i.e. al-
most getting hit by a horn blowing bus coming from the right). Comparable, im-
agine you are looking for your favorite toothpaste in the supermarket. All the fea-
tures of the dozens of products seem similar but you will focus your attention to 
one of the features (maybe a combination of colors) and you will have to ignore 
all other features like words or shape.  
As can be seen in the examples, conflict – the concurrent presence of stimuli or 
action plans - can occur at different stages. Whereas in the street example one has 
to overcome a learned tendency to respond with a look to the left, in the super-
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market example one just has to focus on the relevant features and ignore the irre-
levant features. In cognitive science several stages have become commonly ac-
cepted, starting from stimulus perception and evaluation, to response selection and 
preparation and finally response execution. Cognitive control therefore can be 
studied via a wide range of paradigms, but for the present purpose I will focus on 
stimulus-response compatibility tasks. The prominent Eriksen Flanker paradigm 
(Eriksen, 1974) uses target items that are surrounded by distracting items which 
are either identical to the target (compatible), are different but code for the same 
response (stimulus conflict, because conflict arises only at the perceptual level) or 
are different and code for another response (stimulus and response conflict, be-
cause the flanker indicate a response with the other hand). The stable finding here 
is that people take more time and make more errors during the conflict conditions.  
However, the source or stage of conflict can differ, as for example in the Simon 
task, where the irrelevant location leads to conflict at the response level, or in the 
Stroop task, where the semantic content of the word can lead both to stimulus and 
response conflict. I will refer in the following to compatible conditions when no 
feature of the stimulus introduces conflict and to incompatible conditions when 
either at the perceptual level or later in information processing such as the re-
sponse level conflict is elicited. The assumption here is that all these types of 
within the lab induced conflicts tax higher demands on the control functions com-
pared to situations where no conflicting information occurs. In the past, mainly 
dual-route models were used to account for such interference effects and assumed 
a direct route, which is primed by visuo-motor integration processes and an indi-
rect route which is guided by task instructions (Kornblum et al., 1990). In a "buf-
fer" somehow these two activations are weighted and in a "the-winner-takes-it-all" 
fashion the correct response is selected. Later accounts which will be outlined in 
the next section assigned neuronal counterparts of these processes within different 
portions of the prefrontal cortex. 
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1.2.2 5euronal Underpinnings I: Conflict Processing and Control 
Recent approaches highlight a crucial role of different portions of the prefrontal 
cortex in all control related functions (Miller and Cohen, 2001) and especially the 
medial frontal cortex (MFC) has been acknowledged as a nexus between sensory, 
motoric, subcortical and prefrontal areas (Paus, 2001). In their meta-analysis 
Ridderinkhof et al. (2004) present current perspectives on MFC functioning and 
emphasize its role during pre-response conflict, decision uncertainty, response 
errors, and negative feedback. Especially the conflict monitoring account has led 
to an immense amount of research regarding the cognitive processes that are rea-
lized within this area. Botvinick et al. (2004) propose that a “cortical response to 
conflict” within the MFC, namely anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) can be asso-
ciated with one of three behavioral contexts: during tasks that require overriding 
of pre-potent responses, undetermined responding or during the commission of 
errors. Supported by computational modeling work and numerous imaging studies 
the claim is that ACC signals the occurrence of conflicts in information processing 
and at the same time recruits control from other, mostly lateral prefrontal areas, 
which has been shown by interconnected activation patters (MacDonald et al., 
2000). 
One set of data supporting this ideas stems from electrophysiological approaches 
that used N2 or N2c measures of the event-related brain potential in order to cha-
racterize brain activity during conflict tasks (Heil et al., 2000; Kopp et al., 1996). 
The N2 can be observed as a negative shift over fronto-central scalp locations, 
with a peak between 250 and 350 ms following a No-Go stimulus but also follow-
ing incompatible trials in conflict tasks. Although several studies emphasize an 
exclusive role for N2 enhancements during response conflict (Van Veen and 
Carter, 2002) according to others there is yet no conclusive agreement on which 
processes are reflected in this component family. Folstein and Van Petten (2008) 
point out that the N2 effects typically elicited during cognitive control paradigms 
should be understood as a compound of separate control- and mismatch related 
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subcomponents. Until now, however, no study has directly compared N2 measures 
across different conflict paradigms. 
Additional to other critical voices questioning the essential role of ACC in conflict 
processing (Fellows and Farah, 2005; Grinband et al., 2011) alternative accounts 
propose that the ACC itself can act as a top-down controlling unit that is activated 
whenever incongruent information is entering the system either on stimulus but 
also on response side (Posner and Di Girolamo, 1998). I will follow both outlined 
ideas speculating that different portions of the MFC are activated whenever diver-
gent information enters or emerges within the cognitive system.  
A side question but nevertheless of high importance has been developed already in 
the 60ies by Rabbitt (1966). He observed that people tend to make a speed-
accuracy tradeoff after errors. Since the discovery of the error-related negativity 
(ERN), a negative component with a medial frontal distribution occurring approx-
imately 50-100 ms after making an error (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 
1993), the research on error processing has been enlarged extensively.  
 
On the one hand it was important to know whether the ERN is just another con-
flict that is similarly processed compared to cognitive conflicts (Carter et al., 
1998). Yeung et al. (2004b) tried to explain the properties of the ERN compatible 
to the N2 with a connectionist model concluding that the ERN displays response 
conflict and that monitoring provides a simple mechanism for detecting errors. On 
the other hand also here subsequent behavioral adjustments such as post error 
slowing (PES) could be observed. In their review Danielmeier and Ullsperger 
(2011) point out that PES, post reduction of interference (PERI) and post error 
improvement in accuracy (PIA) can be explained by several accounts. The cogni-
tive control account (Botvinick et al., 2004; Carter et al., 1998; Gehring et al., 
1993), the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009), and the inhibitory account 
(Aron, 2007; Ridderinkhof, 2002) provide complementary accounts on these phe-
nomena. 
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Within this scenery of possible functional MFC properties, the similarity of elec-
trophysiological control indices and theoretical assumptions regarding underlying 
systems my first research issue tries to shed light on the following question: Can 
we extract a common mechanism underlying all interference paradigms and will 
this measure help us to determine whether all conflicts are processed in the same 
way? 
1.3 Conflict Adaptation and Specificity 
Up to now, numerous studies have chosen several pathways to investigate whether 
cognitive control is realized as a unitary mechanism that spans over different do-
mains or whether it consists of several modules / networks that are recruited dur-
ing these operations. 
1.3.1 Functional Perspectives on Conflict Adaptation 
An elegant way to show the temporal variability of control usage was presented 
by Gratton et al. (1992). In a flanker task they showed that control dynamics are 
not only active within a trial but change in a trial-by-trial fashion. They divided 
reactions depending on their direct preceding trial which led to four possible trial 
combinations (cC, cI, iC and iI) and presented a pattern with very strong conflict 
effects following compatible trials and a strong reduction of this effects following 
incompatible trials (i.e. the conflict adaptation effect). They interpreted this con-
text driven strategic adjustments as the result of expectancies about the relative 
utility of the information extracted (in this case use of the flankers) to activate 
responses. Although others pointed out that also other processes like feature-
overlap and direct repetitions (Hommel et al., 2004; Mayr et al., 2003) contribute 
to this pattern it is commonly accepted that the inter-trial adjustments mirror 
partly changes in cognitive control engagement (Ullsperger et al., 2005). 
 
In numerous follow-up studies regarding the question whether such adaptations 
occur also when two conflict types are intermixed empirical findings leave an 
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inconclusive picture: Whereas some groups report such overlays (Freitas et al., 
2007) others do not find any evidence for cross-conflict transfer of control 
(Runger et al., 2010). However, several studies presented evidence for a multiple 
process view one of them suggesting that different types of conflict are resolved 
via distinct cognitive control loops, implying that conflict-driven cognitive control 
processes should not be thought of as emanating from a single, central resource 
but, rather from a collection of conflict-specific regulatory loops that may operate 
in parallel (Egner, 2008).  
1.3.2 5euronal Underpinnings II: Adaptation and 5etworks 
Kerns et al. (2004) and (2006) presented data that supported the interdependency 
between the ACC as a conflict monitoring device and the engagement of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) during cognitive control and behavioral 
adjustments in the upcoming trial. Although a previously assigned role of dlPFC 
has been linked to preparatory activity (MacDonald et al., 2000) and biasing of 
incoming stimuli information (Miller and Cohen, 2001) ambiguous results exist 
whether subsequent behavioral adaptations are caused by MFC or dlPFC 
structures (Mansouri et al., 2009). 
In a meta-analysis by Nee et al. (2007) different conflict paradigms such as 
Stroop, flanker, NoGo, stimulus-response compatibility, Simon and stop signal 
tasks engaged a network comprising ACC, dlPFC, inferior frontal gyrus, posterior 
parietal cortex and anterior insula which has been identified during all tasks. Inte-
restingly, individual task analyses showed differential patterns of activation 
among tasks. They concluded that interference might be resolved among several 
processing stages namely stimulus encoding, response selection and response ex-
ecution and these processes therefore should recruit different neural regions. Simi-
larly, Egner et al. (2007) proposed that several areas serve as independent control-
ling units. Again a compelling question here arises, namely, how these networks 
are organized and whether they interact or not. 
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Despite the interference tasks I presented in the previous section also other func-
tions like motor inhibition have been linked to cognitive control. In his review 
Aron (2007) poses the question whether motor inhibition is fundamentally differ-
ent from other forms of inhibition such as selective attention, memory, or emotion. 
Although he advocates a careful use of this concept he describes motor inhibition 
as a robust member of cognitive control functions. (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003) 
used a NoGo-paradigm and confronted subjects with 3 different NoGo probabili-
ties (20, 50 and 80%). They found larger N200 amplitudes for NoGos in all three 
probabilities but also a frequency effect with greater N2 amplitudes also for rare 
Go signals. Additionally, using dipole modeling they suggest a similar mechanism 
underlying error and conflict detection. 
In a series of experiments we also tested the idea of inter-trial conflict adaptation 
across different paradigms. For this purpose we used a combined Simon-Go-
NoGo-experiment with different amounts of NoGos ranging from 17, 33 to 50% 
per experiment. Our hypotheses following the conflict monitoring account by 
(Botvinick et al., 2004) were that each type of conflict (Simon interference, No-
Gos and errors) should lead to enhancements of cognitive control in the upcoming 
trial. The conflict adaptation effect depending on predecessor event, N2 measures, 
as well as the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) should mirror the engagement 
of cognitive control following incompatible Simon trials and NoGo trials. Surpri-
singly, we found that only after incompatible Simon trials but not after inhibition 
or erroneous trials a reduction of interference at the behavioral level occurred. 
Furthermore, the wrong hand LRP reduction was visible only after incompatible 
trials, while following NoGos and Errors only a general slowdown in RT was ob-
served affecting mainly compatible trials. Again, these results question a unified 
control instance equally responsible for different conflict resolution processes and 
subsequent behavioral adjustments. 
My second research question builds upon these pilot studies and focuses on net-
work interactions among different types of cognitive conflict. To standardize the 
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induced conflicts the flanker paradigm with its stimulus and response conflicts 
was suited ideally for the time-frequency analyses which will be introduced be-
low.  
1.4  “Warm” Perspectives on Control: Conflict Adaptation, Errors, and 
Dopamine 
Besides confronting the brain with different conflicts to answer the yet unresolved 
question how multiple mechanisms work in parallel to allow conflict resolution 
and adaptation another approach could be to ask whether these subsystems are 
influenced differentially by other modulatory influences like emotions or motiva-
tion.  
Ashby et al. (1999) proposed that positive affect leads to temporary increase in of 
DA in mid-brain DA-generation centers which is propagated to prefrontal cortex 
and striatum. They proposed further that increased DA levels enhance the ability 
to overcome dominant responses and increase cognitive flexibility in various 
tasks. The evaluative function of MFC subareas has further been investigated 
within the theoretical framework of reinforcement learning, especially the error-
processing system as a learning mechanism: Holroyd and Coles (2002) highlight 
the close interactions between MFC and Basal Ganglia (BG) via an interlaced 
mesencephalic dopamine system which enables phasic as well as tonic changes in 
dopamine (DA) levels (Schultz, 1998; 2007; 2010). Bush et al. (2000) proposed a 
similar view emphasizing cognitive as well as emotional influences in anterior 
cingulate cortex. He highlights the role of ACC as part of the limbic system there-
fore receiving input from several sources and puts forward the idea that the ACC 
is a part of a circuit involved in a form of attention that serves to regulate both 
cognitive and emotional processing. Whereas the cognitive division encapsulates 
dorsal portions of the MFC, the affective division is situated in the more rostral-
ventral portions of MFC. He further raises the question, where in this subdivision 
error processing has to be situated and more importantly, how interactions be-
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tween cognitive and emotional processes are realized. (Botvinick, 2007) inte-
grated the conflict monitoring and the reinforcement learning account by claiming 
that conflicts are perceived as aversive themselves and should therefore lead to 
similar adaptation as errors or aversive events.  
In our laboratory we tested this prediction in a project where NoGo tasks were 
combined with emotional measurements (Schacht et al., 2009). Against previous 
hypotheses results indicated that conflicts are not experienced as aversive but in-
hibition might be appraised as goal-obstructive, which was further substantiated in 
a follow-up study (Schacht et al., 2010). If the conflicts themselves are not neces-
sarily experienced aversive one could therefore ask, which other factors influence 
conflict processing and with respect to the assumed overlap of error and conflict 
processing whether positive or negative affect improve control / error monitoring. 
A study by van Steenbergen et al. (2009) followed also the idea of aversive per-
ceived conflicts and induced unpredictable gains or losses in a flanker task. This 
lottery-like procedure affected conflict adaptation such that after monetary re-
wards the conflict adaptation effect decreased compared to neutral of negative 
events. In their view the reward neutralized the aversive quality of conflict and led 
do a down-regulation of control. 
Besides conflict processing several researchers have investigated if and how error 
processing can also be altered by induction of affective moods and motivation. 
Studies focusing on ERN modulations have come to inconclusive results, either 
resulting in decreased ERN amplitudes following negative feedback (Ogawa et 
al., 2011) or increased ERNs (Wiswede et al., 2009a). Furthermore pleasant 
moods led to either larger ERNs (Larson et al., 2006), but unconscious smiling on 
the other hand led to smaller ERNs (Wiswede et al., 2009b). As can be seen from 
these exemplary studies the induction of mood, emotion, or motivation is still not 
standardized and much more experimental protocols have to be established in or-
der to investigate cognition-emotion interdependencies. Despite the ERN another 
component, the feedback-related negativity (FRN), has been a valuable tool to 
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measure the appraisal of the motivational impact of certain outcome events. The 
FRN is a relatively negative deflection in the ERP and has been widely used in 
reinforcement-learning tasks (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd et al., 
2003) or in the framework of reinforcement learning regarding the reward predic-
tion error (Hajcak et al., 2005). 
In my third study, I approached the affective influence on conflict adaptation by 
combining a Simon task with two feedback regimes that were either unpredictable 
or performance-dependent. Study 3 will address the issues regarding the effects of 
induced motivational “contexts” on conflict and error processing as well as adap-
tations. 
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2 Approaches to Dynamics in Cognitive Control 
Up to now I have presented mainly results from studies using functional imaging 
or electrophysiological methods that try to assign functional roles to certain brain 
areas. Besides such findings with a functional localization character, in recent 
years the call for network descriptions enabling certain cognitive functions has 
received more and more attention. An important goal here is to use techniques that 
do not only provide information about an assumed location of a certain process 
but to integrate this location as a node into a distributed network: To get informa-
tion about the networks underlying conflict resolution I chose a dynamic approach 
which will be shortly outlined in this section. 
2.1 Additional information from time frequency transformed data 
To understand the cognitive architecture of the human mind and also to measure 
brain activity with an emphasis on high temporal resolution event-related poten-
tials (ERPs) have provided a tremendously exciting amount of empirical data from 
all cognitive domains. In the area of cognitive control mainly the already men-
tioned N200 family as well as the ERN and FRN have been used extensively to 
characterize the interplay of processes and mechanism related to performance 
monitoring, response evaluation and conflict processing.  
In contrast to the averaged ERP time-frequency transformed data offers another 
perspective on brain function. Makeig et al. (2004) oppose two “views” on brain 
activity - the ERP and the dynamic view - that focus on different aspects of the 
EEG data and complement each other. One of the main assumptions when analyz-
ing ERPs is that they are understood in a sequential, bottom up fashion irrespec-
tive of the as non-relevant rated background activity. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that brief, monophasic potentials contribute similarly to the evoked potential and 
therefore can be seen in the averaged potential only. However, these assumptions 
have some drawbacks mainly in regard to the notion that background activity can-
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not tell anything about the current status of the system and that processes underly-
ing cognitive phenomena are always time-locked to the stimulus or the response. 
It has been shown for example that alpha activity in the pre-stimulus interval pre-
dicts whether or not a visual cue will be perceived or not (Hanslmayr et al., 2007). 
However, the most significant disadvantage of conventional ERP average tech-
nique is that the signal traces from changes in power, which reflect partly phasic 
synchronous activity of neuronal populations will be deleted. In contrast, time-
frequency representations preserve such local synchronous activity. 
But, how can we measure such power changes? As proven by Fourier any periodic 
function (signal) can be described in terms of an infinite sum of sine and cosine 
functions with (harmonic) frequencies. Therefore spectral analyses have also been 
used in EEG research. As an extension of (short-term) Fourier transformation, 
which calculates the frequency and phase content of local sections of a signal as it 
changes over time, wavelets are continuously shifted (convoluted) along the signal 
and calculate the spectrum for every single time point. Then this process is re-
peated many times with a slightly shorter or longer wavelet (daughter wavelets) 
formed by translation and contraction. In the end the result will be a collection of 
time-frequency representations of the signal that can be averaged together.  
Physiologically, two possible reasons can be responsible for an increase in the 
amplitude / power of a certain frequency component of the EEG: First, although 
the amount of neuronal activity stays the same, more precise synchronization can 
lead to less loss during summation. Second, although the precision of synchroni-
zation stays the same more neuronal activity is induced by a larger locally syn-
chronizing population. Therefore, time-frequency analysis of power is mainly 
sensitive to changes in oscillatory neuronal activity and/ or synchronization at the 
local level (see Yeung et al. (2004a) for a discussion of the methodological ca-
veats of such analyses). 
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Since the discovery of the alpha rhythm described by Berger (1929) many re-
searchers have tried to assign specific functional roles to certain somewhat arbitra-
rily defined bands.  For example, hippocampal theta has been assigned to such a 
range of different cognitive functions across species ranging from arousal, over 
orienting, memory consolidation, positive emotions and motivation, voluntary 
movements and many more (see Buzsaki (2005) for an extensive review) that it 
seems unreasonable to think of certain bands reserved for only one functional 
process. However, a precise assignment of possible functional roles to oscillatory 
phenomena remains to be developed. 
Although several taxonomies for these phenomena exist, such as evoked versus 
induced activity, (Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999), event-related synchro-
nization and desynchronization (Klimesch et al., 2007) or event-related spectral 
perturbations (Makeig et al., 2004) all approaches assume coherent local or distri-
buted neuronal oscillations as generators for the power changes that can be ob-
served in the scalp EEG. 
To elucidate cognitive control functions most studies have used the theta band (4-
8 Hz) in order to investigate error processing (Luu and Tucker, 2001; Yordanova 
et al., 2004). However, until now no one has looked at theta power changes in 
humans during conflict processing or across several conflict paradigms. Given its 
involvement in performance monitoring functions it should therefore also be sen-
sitive to cognitive demands during correct responses. Study 1 of this dissertation 
therefore aimed at testing whether theta activity can be used as a general measure 
of conflict processing.  
2.2 Synchrony measures of EEG 
Additional to pure power representations of the EEG signal there is more relevant 
information provided by the phase characteristics of the signal. A very intriguing 
idea regards the claim that different brain areas responsible for different mental 
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processes such as perceptual processing, stimulus evaluation and response pro-
gramming are realized in distributed networks (Basar et al., 2001; Klimesch et al., 
2007). Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva (1999) describe two main factors that de-
termine the properties of EEG oscillations: First, the intrinsic membrane proper-
ties of the neurons and the dynamics of synaptic processes, and second the 
strength and extent of the interconnections between network elements, most often 
formed by feedback loops. They argue that different kinds of feedback loops can 
be distinguished, namely involving thalamo-cortical or cortico-cortical loops ei-
ther at short or at long distances. As a third factor they mention the modulating 
influences from general or local neurotransmitter systems. To summarize, local 
and large scale integration networks seem to operate via specific frequency bands 
and these transient processes can be characterized by their spatial, temporal and 
frequency specific properties. Several computational approaches and theoretical 
accounts (Dehaene et al. (1998) with a global workspace model or Lamme and 
Roelfsema (2000) in their consciousness definitions) therefore assume that recur-
rent networks can hold information exactly via these distributed networks of activ-
ity.  
To embed cognitive control functions within such networks Engel et al. (2001) 
suggest that several levels of top-down control work in parallel. In their view top–
down factors can lead to states of ‘expectancy’ or ‘anticipation’ that can be ex-
pressed in the temporal structure of activity patterns before the appearance of sti-
muli. Additionally, Varela et al. (2001) suggest that information coding in the 
brain depends on concurrent activation of neurons distributed across different 
brain areas that are transiently linked by reciprocal dynamic connections. Top-
down and bottom-up processes are therefore heuristic terms for a large-scale net-
work that integrates (top-down) endogenous activity from frontal and limbic areas 
and (bottom-up) incoming sensoric activity. In this view, phase synchronization is 
the integration mechanism that organizes this large-scale brain network. 
 18 
 
To investigate such cognitive control synchronizations the theta band has been 
used in the area of error processing (Cavanagh et al., 2009; Luu et al., 2004), con-
flict processing (Cohen and Cavanagh, 2011; Hanslmayr et al., 2008) and also in 
memory related top-down functions (Sauseng et al., 2010). Theta activity is pri-
marily associated with top-down processes, such as response controlling or (Basar 
et al., 2001) but seems to act also in broader integration mechanism via cross-
frequency coupling (Jensen and Colgin, 2007).  
In order to use phase characteristics to describe such mechanisms, one has to cal-
culate some measure of coherence. Coherence is a measure of neuronal synchro-
nization between two signals. It is normalized for the amplitude of the two sig-
nals. Thus, amplitude changes of the EEG signals do not affect coherence. The 
coherence measure avoids the confound between the precision of synchronization 
and the amount of activity that is unavoidable when neuronal synchronization is 
indirectly measured as the amplitude of EEG oscillations.  
Following these methodological approaches, study 2 investigated specific neuron-
al networks underlying the resolution of stimulus and response conflict in terms of 
“inter-channel-phase-synchrony” (ICPS). These networks were previously defined 
according to neuro-anatomical considerations derived from recent theoretical 
frameworks.  
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3 Summary of studies 
Based on the state of the art research outlined above, the following studies aimed 
at shedding light on the question of conflict specificity from different perspec-
tives: Study 1 and 2 concentrate on the basic functional aspects of conflict 
processing, namely theta activity as a general marker for cognitive conflict (study 
1) and theta synchrony as the means of coordinated activity in order to overcome 
response conflict in a flanker task (study 2). Study 3 then takes a much broader 
perspective since here differential modulations of conflict and error adaptation 
processes are investigated to test whether the processes belong to the same system 
or not. 
3.1 Study 1 - Conflict Control: Common Cognitive Mechanisms 
Research Question: Study 1 aimed at testing for a common mechanism underlying 
any conflict resolution processes as assumed in three classical interference para-
digms. Therefore we applied a within-subject design to compare performance and 
neural correlates along a Simon task, a Go-NoGo task and a flanker task. Both the 
Simon and the flanker task are known to induce behavioral conflicts at the level of 
response programming. Additionally, we used a Go-NoGo paradigm with 33% 
NoGos which seem to be sufficient to induce a prepotent response tendency in 
every trial which has to be withheld in one third of all cases. Although many stu-
dies reported bigger N2 amplitudes during such interference tasks (Heil et al., 
2000; Kopp et al., 1996) no one ever compared these tasks and the elicited brain 
activity in a within-subject design. We concentrated on the theta band because 
some theories, especially the conflict monitoring account by Botvinick et al. 
(2001) assume a close link between response evaluation and conflict detection 
processes when not even equate them. Since many studies have shown an in-
volvement of theta in ERN generation the rationale behind the study was that si-
milarly during conflict detection and response execution processes theta should 
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play an important functional role. As an approximation of the loci of these activi-
ties dipole modeling was used to confirm tentative sources of the theta power dif-
ferences. 
Results: Strong evidence for consistent theta enhancement was found in all three 
paradigms. As visible in the time frequency plots within the theta band a promi-
nent burst was visible in all three paradigms. This burst ranged from 200-400 ms 
in the Simon and Go-NoGo paradigm, in the flanker time the onset started around 
the target presentation (note that flankers in this task were presented 150 ms be-
fore the target). Comparing the theta activity differences strongest amplitude dif-
ferences within theta power were visible in the NoGo and the flanker paradigm 
compared to the Simon task. Dipole modeling suggested pre-SMA and motor 
areas or errors, false alarms, Simon as well as response conflict in the flanker task. 
Discussion: To conclude, we could show that conflicts lead to a consistent theta 
power enhancement across different interference paradigms, but the possible 
sources might be distributed differentially. Theta, therefore, might act as in inte-
gration mechanism of a broader distributed network which engages stronger the 
more conflicting information enters the stream of information processing. The 
more response output related these conflict arise the closer to motor areas these 
mechanism might engage.  
Gain in knowledge: Theta power seems to reflect a unitary mechanism underlying 
conflict control in all used conflict paradigms situated within MFC. Nevertheless, 
the present findings do not hint to a local restricted phenomenon but instead sug-
gest a general mechanism possibly acting as a functional integration-loop thereby 
also influenced by other brain structures. 
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3.2 Study 2 - Conflict Control: Specific Types of Conflict Resolution 
Research Questions: The aim of study 2 was to use theta synchrony measures to 
test the hypothesized recruiting mechanism between left lateral PFC and MFC 
(Kerns et al., 2004; MacDonald et al., 2000). Furthermore, since some researchers 
assume an involvement of right prefrontal cortex in general inhibition processes 
we also tested this connection (Aron, 2007). Additionally, following ideas that 
assume a direct involvement in motor control of MFC we checked whether ipsi- 
and/or contra-lateral motor cortices engage differently during a paradigm which is 
ideally suited for comparing different types of conflict: In the flanker task two 
types of conflict are realized namely response conflict (which is occurring when-
ever two response alternatives are activated at the same time) and perceptual con-
flict (which occurs whenever the surrounding flankers differ from the target sti-
mulus, but indicate the same response). We used continuous wavelet 
transformations in order to extract power and phase information of the EEG signal 
in the theta band (4-8 Hz) and calculated inter-channel-phase-coherence and inter 
trial phase coherence according to the MFC connections as pointed out above. 
Results: We found that inter-channel-phase-synchrony was enhanced following 
our predictions: synchrony between medial frontal and lateral prefrontal electrode 
sites was enhanced only during the more demanding response conflict condition. 
Similarly, synchrony between medial frontal and motor sites contra-lateral to the 
respective response hand was enhanced in response conflict situations. In contrast, 
stimulus conflict did not lead to enhancements of inter-channel-phase-synchrony 
but nevertheless to an increase in theta power.  
Discussion: The present findings speak against the claim that MFC activation is 
only enhanced during response conflict (van Veen et al., 2001) but supports ac-
counts assuming that MFC itself can exert a response controlling function (Posner 
and Di Girolamo, 1998). While theta power was enhanced in both conflict situa-
tions, prefrontal-medial-lateral couplings were only observed during response 
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conflict. Furthermore, couplings between MFC and motor sites contra-lateral to 
the response hand were also observed. MFC coupling with early perceptual areas 
were rare and more likely due to sensory-motor integration processes during re-
sponse execution. Follow-up analyses showed that also lateral prefrontal areas 
were connected to motor execution areas. 
Gain in knowledge: By using time-frequency transformed EEG data we could 
provide evidence for a condition dependent change in brain connectivity as meas-
ured via inter-channel-phase-synchrony. Following previous reports of MFC-
LPFC coupling from functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) literature our results 
support the idea of enhanced communication in cognitive demanding situations. 
Interestingly, theta power and theta synchrony measures dissociated between sti-
mulus and response conflict, suggesting a highly sensitive network with a unitary 
conflict detection unit (theta power) and a specific network configuration to re-
solve response conflicts (theta synchrony). 
3.3 Study 3 - Conflict Adaptation: Modulatory Influences of Affect 
Research question: Study 3 consists of two interconnected experiments that aim to 
test modulatory influences of motivational contexts on conflict adaptation. The 
first experiment has a replicatory character regarding the finding by van 
Steenbergen et al. (2009) that reward and positive affect diminish behavioral con-
flict adaptation. Following the claim by Botvinick (2007) that every conflict has 
an aversive quality, aversive events themselves should also induce adjustments in 
subsequent processing and should therefore also lead to conflict adaptation. How-
ever, a positive unexpected event in this view should then counteract conflict 
adaptation and should therefore lead to a smaller conflict adaptation compared to 
neutral or negative outcomes. Even brief affective states should modulate cogni-
tive control and especially reward and punishment should due to their close lin-
kage to dopamine levels (Schultz, 2010) alter conflict processing. In a first expe-
riment we combined a Simon task with a lottery algorithm so that participants 
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could either win or lose a certain amount of money following every trial. As a 
baseline condition also neutral feedbacks were introduced and finally conflict 
adaptation effects could be compared due to their preceding feedback. We also 
used EEG recording to check whether feedback is processed according to our hy-
potheses. In a second experiment we used performance-dependent feedback in 
two separate blocks. In one block participants were rewarded for their fastest 25% 
RTs (reward block) whereas in another block they were punished in their slowest 
25% of RTs (punishment block). An adaptive staircase algorithm secured that each 
participant received in 25% of all trials a gain or loss feedback, during the other 
75% they received a neutral “blank” feedback indicating that they neither won nor 
lost anything. Additionally, we were interested in whether error and conflict 
processing would be influenced differentially by these contexts and analyzed be-
sides feedback-related components also the ERN and behavioral post-error slow-
ing (PES). If reward would suppress conflict adaptation (CA) it should also sup-
press error adaptation, assuming that both processes are dependent. If PES would 
be influenced differently compared to CA this would be another hint to a relative 
independence of these systems. 
Results: We could not replicate the finding by (van Steenbergen et al., 2009) in 
our Simon task, conflict adaptation was not influenced at all by the motivational 
state caused by previous feedback although FRN measures confirmed feedback 
processing according to our hypotheses. In our second experiment performance-
contingent feedback influenced conflict adaptation only in the reward block, 
where conflict adaptation was increased after gain signals compared to blank 
feedback. No such changes were found in the punishment block. Furthermore, 
error adaptation was strongly influenced by our motivational context manipulation 
and ERN as well PES measures were significantly enhanced in the reward block. 
Discussion: We found that not conflict adaptation per se but error adaptation is 
influenced by the motivational contexts set in the used tasks. Behavioral data as 
well as the ERN measures suggest that mainly error processing and error adapta-
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tion were influenced by motivational context. Feedback that was not contingent to 
performance did not alter conflict adaptation. Present findings show that modula-
tory influences on conflict and error adaptation dissociate and, therefore, under-
line the claim of distinguishable adaptation mechanisms probably not sharing 
common neural substrates. 
Gain in knowledge: Surprisingly, the Simon conflict and its adaptation are only 
marginally influenced by manipulations induced by reward and punishment. The 
claim that affects generally influence cognitive functions seems therefore overex-
tended at least for our experimental paradigm. It remains an open question why 
flanker and Simon conflicts differ in this respect. However, robust effects were 
found in the domain of error processing. A preliminary account could propose that 
if strategic adjustments following errors are propagated via dopaminergic projec-
tions from limbic to neocortical areas, the DA changes induced by reward and 
punishment feedbacks seem not to stretch out to areas responsible for motor con-
flict resolution. This can be understood as another hint to the idea that conflict 
adaptation and error processing are realized via two independent networks that are 
differentially affected by long- and short-term changes in outcomes. 
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4 General Discussion 
In the framework of this dissertation I aimed at investigating various aspects of 
cognitive control functions and their neural counterparts as measured by different 
electrophysiological indices. The presented studies started from two theoretical 
accounts that have recently progressively been incorporated (Botvinick, 2007). 
The first approach is driven by ideas from conflict monitoring theory which is 
based on the assumption that a conflict-control loop constantly adapts according 
to changing environmental demands. In theory, this loop consists of a conflict 
detection device that is situated within (dorsal) medial frontal cortex and interacts 
with (left) lateral prefrontal cortex. This, in turn can modulate information 
processing by biasing incoming stimuli according to its utility for goal-directed 
behavior (Botvinick et al., 2004; Carter et al., 1998). Furthermore, it has been 
stated that once the MFC has been activated it triggers several other phenomena 
which can be observed as behavioral adaptations, namely increased control in the 
upcoming trial and post-error slowing (Debener et al., 2005; Kerns, 2006; 2004; 
MacDonald et al., 2000).  
The second approach is derived from approaches emphasizing “warm” emotional 
and motivational aspects of cognitive control that are linked to outcome evalua-
tion functions and also situated within of (rostral / ventral) MFC. Due to its prox-
imity to limbic cortex traversed by dopaminergic projections from basal ganglia 
structures some authors suggested that the lower parts of MFC (in close proximity 
to orbitofrontal cortex) are involved in calculations of reward prediction errors 
and cost-benefit decision making (Bush et al., 2000; Holroyd and Coles, 2008; 
Rushworth et al., 2004). 
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Similarities in conflict processing via ERPs and time-frequency transformations 
Therefore, my research questions are located between the conceptual gap of cog-
nitive and emotional processing and their respective neuronal correlates. The first 
two studies aim at resolving the question to what extent conflict processing within 
a trial is accompanied by a unitary mechanism. The functional role of this me-
chanism might be related to detection processes but also to regulatory activity 
over motor output structures. In detail, the second study tries to elucidate the em-
bedding of this mechanism within a neural network dynamics that are differential-
ly engaged depending on the domain where conflict has to be resolved. In con-
trast, the third study had a twofold question of interest and used motivational 
contexts as an independent variable. First, we were interested whether positive or 
negative outcomes would improve conflict processing and adaptation. Second, 
keeping in mind the proposed overlap of conflict and error processing we ex-
amined whether these processes were influenced similarly or differentially by mo-
tivational incentives.  
Study 1 and 2 shed light on the question how general these mechanisms are by 
comparing conflict resolution processes stemming from different sources. Regard-
ing the question how general MFC involvement in such conflict tasks is present 
data of study 1 provides clear evidence that N2 measures as well as theta activity 
seem to be sensitive to all different kinds of conflict. Dipole-modeling suggested a 
more fine grained subdivision of MFC with theta activity centers in motor prepa-
ration areas during conflicts at the response level but also during errors. In con-
trast, during stimulus conflict the center of activity was shifted towards ventral 
portions of the MFC. 
Specificities in conflict resolution and error processing 
Study 2 extends the use of theta power to investigate dynamic changes in network 
activity during stimulus and response conflict in the flanker task. Surprisingly, we 
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found robust dissociations of theta power and theta synchrony during both types 
of conflict. Whereas theta power over medial frontal sites was enhanced in both 
conflict conditions, an increase in synchrony between MFC and LPFCs was only 
observed in response conflict situations. Furthermore, comparable activity pat-
terns of synchrony between MFC, LPFCs and motor areas seem to suggest, that 
these structures form a network that is activated during response conflict. Against 
previous assumptions, that MFC is exclusively active during response conflict our 
data show that also a conflict in stimulus encoding leads to theta enhancement.  
There are several limitations which should be accounted for in future experiments 
and analyses: The theta power results in study 1 have to be interpreted carefully 
for several reasons. On the one hand, since power is a measure of squared theta 
activity it cannot be disentangled to what proportion “by proxy” ERP components 
(P2, N2 or P3) in each individual trial might be associated with power changes. To 
circumvent this interpretation difficulties one has to check also the non-squared 
activity pattern in order to determine whether positive or negative deflections are 
responsible for the observed effects. On the other hand, several researchers have 
pointed out that there exist differences in inter-trial phase coherence (Yordanova 
et al., 2004) and although we have ruled out that this influences our results in 
study 2, study 1 did not provide data for this possible confound. Finally, some 
authors have proposed that there exist individual band borders which have to be 
aligned to an alpha peak recorded independent of the experimental data 
(Klimesch, 1999). A further point regards the synchrony effect maps of study 2, 
which although strictly hypothesized previously regarding its analyzed electrode 
pairs show somewhat diffuse scalp distributions, broadly distributed over several 
prefrontal areas. A more advanced analyses scheme could analyze synchrony 
across all possible electrode pairs and then determine which statistical boundaries 
could be used to extract meaningful network activity. 
Study 3 then takes again a more general perspective on conflict adaptation effects 
using behavioral effects and ERPs. We established two experimental enviroments 
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in which participants either could gain or lose money, performance independent 
and contingent. Contrary to expectations, conflict adaptation was only marginally 
influenced by motivational contexts. Neither the short term effects of feedback in 
the upcoming trial nor the block effects resulted in a coherent pattern of control-
motivation interactions. However, we found strong effects in ERN measures as 
well as behavioral adjustments following errors which corroborate the suggestion 
that two complementary modes of cognitive control, namely proactive and re-
troactive are situated within different portions of MFC (Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010; 
Isoda and Hikosaka, 2011; Ullsperger and King, 2010). Therefore, it can be specu-
lated that re-(tro)-active control, accompanied by alterations of midbrain DA re-
lease, is susceptible to changes in DA level caused by reward and punishment and 
results in direct strategic adjustments of response thresholds. In contrast, proactive 
control, associated with improvements in performance monitoring is not suscepti-
ble to such modulations since the responsible brain areas (pre-SMA) are not di-
rectly connected to the midbrain DA system.  
Although our experiment did not detect any evidence for modulations of conflict 
adaptation one has to be careful to jump to conclusion regarding the interplay of 
emotion and motivation and cognitive processing: As mentioned in the introduc-
tion mood inductions can be performed via many different stimuli ranging from 
pictures, videos, music, face expressions, verbal admonishments and monetary 
gains and losses, related to performance or not. It remains unclear, which feed-
back form works on which emotional system or neural pathway. To pose the ques-
tion from the neuronal perspective we know that reward and punishment are un-
likely to be processed via the same pathways (Berridge and Robinson, 2003; 
Haber and Knutson, 2010) and also are influenced by other factors like arousal or 
endocrinal factors. Hence, a precise hypothesis of the effect of certain external 
feedback stimuli should be able to predict a) where in the neural system a change 
in DA levels should lead to b) which processing benefits or difficulties over c) 
which time-course.  
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A final interesting unreported finding from study one relates to the correlations of 
PES and conflict adaptation across paradigms. While conflict adaptation measures 
as well as interference effects seem to be uncorrelated across paradigms, there is a 
strong correlation regarding the PES effects. One the one hand, this again speaks 
for a dissociation of conflict and error adjustments as mentioned before. On the 
other hand the reliability of PES (Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011) has also been 
related to structural differences in white matter tracts (Segalowitz et al., 2010) 
which might be relatively stable over time. An interesting question would be to 
compare post conflict slowing with PES in order to find out whether the assumed 
neuroanatomical basis, consisting of pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), 
lateral inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and right nucleus subthalamicus (STN) (Aron, 
2007) is involved in both slowing processes. 
Theta networks in the service of cognitive control 
MFC theta activity was increased during stimulus and response conflict. We found 
specific theta inter-channel-phase-synchrony patterns along relevant brain areas, 
supporting the idea that lPFC-MFC-communication is enhanced during response 
conflicts. However, MFC-motor-couplings can be interpreted as involvement of 
MFC in response controlling processes. According to Luu et al. (2003) theta ap-
pears to index the adaptive adjustments required for the ongoing regulation of 
action and also be incorporated in the Papez circuit. In our analyses theta power 
was obviously concentrated over medial frontal cortex in all paradigms and 
seemed to be a major rhythm in frontal areas during performance monitoring and 
action selection. I speculate that theta activity although possibly generated in hip-
pocampal areas, forms a coordinating activity net / loop that reacts whenever cer-
tain changes in the level of entropy in information processing is reached. It is 
highly predestinated to incorporate signals from other brain areas which might be 
coded in faster oscillations and could also pre-activate motor responses. In a glob-
al workspace model theta nodes could be the frame-frequency for integrating in-
formation from different areas. 
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Control is enabled via several such recurrent networks. From a dynamic brain 
perspective it is likely that neuronal activity codes via different frequency bands 
information with fast oscillations predominantly in sensory cortices (gamma) and 
slower oscillations in slower band like alpha or theta. The described Papez circuit 
seems to be the candidate because it is known that theta is generated in the mamil-
liary bodies / septum in rats. Furthermore it is perfectly suited for the online-
monitoring of behavioral outputs as well as environmental events and feedback. 
Functionally, the different portions of the MFC are responsible for detecting any 
deviation ranging from rare unexpected stimulus input, motor activations, as well 
as deviations from predicted external outcome and errors. 
Towards a building block model of cognitive control and adaptations 
Although using a broad approach to investigate control functions can have disad-
vantages regarding the interpretation of results within qualitatively different theo-
retical perspectives, considering both cognitive and motivational aspects can help 
understanding the assumed processes and mechanisms. 
Considering the evidence from the different data sets of this experimental series 
we can conclude that the assumed parcellation of MFC into regions responsible 
for either more evaluative functions of more conflict resolution processes fits sur-
prisingly well our results. Although we used motivational contexts only as a mod-
ulatory manipulation our results support the idea that error processing and conflict 
resolution seem to be realized via mainly independent neuronal systems. Whereas 
motivational context affects ERN and PES measures, conflict adaptation is largely 
unaffected. Furthermore, the theta activity observed during errors was located 
very close to pre-motor areas instead of the usually reported locations from fMRI 
studies. Considering the inconsistency of measures from BOLD activity, ERPs 
and band specific power changes much more research is needed to account for 
such differences. 
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However, in order to link results of the first two studies with the last study much 
more research is needed: When talking about building blocks of cognitive control 
we have to keep in mind that possibly several mechanisms lead to observable ad-
justments: Candidate mechanism for such constituents involve (1) a basic re-
sponse threshold modulation (possibly realized via sub-cortical dependent DA 
pathways resulting in changes in tonic motor excitability), (2) specific conflict 
adaptation mechanisms (stemming from domain specific top-down biasing me-
chanisms) and (3) low level influences (elicited by arousal, orienting, emotional 
valence and motivational manipulations). 
Conclusion 
The goal of this dissertation was to advance knowledge about different cognitive 
control functions and their relations within the cognitive domain as well with mo-
tivational modules. Both systems seem inseparable from each other in terms of 
cognitive processing as well as neural realization to enable any goal-directed be-
havior. The main question of my thesis, namely how conflict-specific cognitive 
control works can naturally not be answered with a yes or no: While we find sev-
eral hints for a general involvement of MFC activity in all applied conflict para-
digms the much more interesting questions arise when taking into account the 
manifold dissociations either in neural activity related to different conflicts or the 
dissociable impacts of motivational factors on conflict and error processing. To 
deconstruct the homunculus in cognitive control a much more fine-grained ap-
proach to the in parallel working systems, their main “hubs” and the involved neu-
rotransmitter system is needed. New analyses techniques such as time-frequency 
and coherence analyses open a wide landscape of fascinating future studies that 
might help to explain the complex strategies we use to adapt to our environment. 
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5 Future Directions 
In my dissertation I focused mainly on theta power and synchrony measures. A 
challenge for future studies will regard the relation of certain “frequency-band–
location combinations” to event-related potentials and fMRI signals. To follow 
their different time-courses combined measurements would help to understand 
their interactions. For example, a systematic search for other markers that can be 
related to certain functions, such as beta- and µu-oscillations over motor areas 
(Pfurtscheller et al., 2006), alpha power over posterior areas (Romei et al., 2008) 
or theta and gamma power over prefrontal and parietal areas (Sederberg et al., 
2003) could help to investigate the dynamic brain activity during preparatory, ex-
ecutive and evaluative processes in various tasks. 
Related to further identification of cognitive control networks there can be thought 
of several approaches: First, confronting subjects with other control related de-
mands such as working memory or task switching could help to elucidate the role 
of theta power, which in the area of memory related control has been investigated 
intensively already (Sauseng et al., 2010). Second, since we only can measure 
roughly what happens under the surface of the scalp, more advanced analyses 
techniques should helpful to investigate intrinsic properties of brain organization. 
These include cross frequency couplings, such as theta-gamma couplings and es-
pecially phase-phase and phase-power relations during information processing 
(Cohen, 2011; Jensen and Colgin, 2007). 
Additionally, the emotional side of the control coin raises also the question, how 
emotions and affects themselves can be controlled. Here the mechanisms of self 
regulation, emotion regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005) and their relation to 
known inhibitory mechanisms can possibly help to unite emotional theories with 
cognitive control ideas.  
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Furthermore, a pending task in my project has been the use of transcranial-
magnetic stimulation (TMS). Once certain spectral markers have been identified, 
one could use disturbing as well as supporting TMS-protocols either to change 
motor thresholds or to disturb other regulatory control centers. Candidate areas 
would be lateral prefrontal cortices as well as sensory-motor integration areas in 
posterior parietal cortices. 
To summarize, the mentioned in parallel working systems can possibly be de-
scribed as connected networks that are can be measured via different means 
(phase coherence, transmitter interactions, white matter connectivity, genetic and 
individual variablity, and many others). The insight in these system interactions 
can provide a more fine-grained understanding of cognitive control functions. 
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